

# Submission to Department of Finance Pre-Budget Consultation on Budget 2021

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Prepared by

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## Summary

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This contribution makes 3 points on Canada's support for international development:

### 1. The need for more thoughtful messaging and meaningful transparency

Canada's recent COVAX dilemma is a result of unfortunate messaging and timing. It shows **simplistic ideas about burden sharing popular in the development sector do not always work in practice**. Lack of transparency and unclear messaging regarding Canada's contributions to and expectations of COVAX made matters worse. Measured rhetoric and meaningful transparency are especially important in a crisis. Key data on Canada's global response remain **unclear or unavailable**.

### 2. Avoid past mistakes and commit to sustainable increases in development spending that are maintained beyond crisis mode

Donors often increase aid spending in the short term in response to crisis, but sharp short-term increases are never sustained. **We highlight three cases where political incentives and messaging created long term challenges**: 9/11; the "Ebola effect"; and the refugee crisis. Our projections show without long-term profiled increases Canada's spending levels will fall considerably (as a ratio to national income) by 2030. **Aid spending may be particularly vulnerable to fiscal realities coming out of this exceptional crisis period. Far more useful than linking spending to crisis response would be for donors to commit to increases that are sustainable beyond crisis mode.**

### 3. Review Canada's engagement with the multilateral development system

**The vast majority of Canada's CAD\$1.6-2bn contribution to international COVID response has been intermediated via key multilaterals** (many of which did not exist pre pandemic). This is a win for multilateralism and for Canada as a founding member and leading financial contributor to each. However, given the level of Canada's aid (over 60% of GAC programming) that is now delivered via multilateral channels, it is important to **examine whether Canada's multilateral engagement is right sized, i.e., balanced** in terms of modalities and options, commensurate with resources and capacity, and consistent with strategic objectives and priorities.

## 1. The need for more thoughtful messaging and meaningful transparency<sup>1</sup>

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Coming into 2020 Canada's aid spending was near its lowest level as a proportion of national income and in the bottom half of all OECD-DAC donors. And yet, Canada's global response to COVID-19 (as our data annex illustrates) has been among the fastest and strongest. Even so, at present, Canada is an outlier in many respects and its experience is a lesson to donors in the importance of measured rhetoric and meaningful transparency.

**Canada's Covax dilemma is a result of political not health factors.** It shows simplistic ideas about burden sharing and solidarity popular in the development sector are unconvincing to the public.

The OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is working on soon to be released data that will likely praise donors for 'stepping up to the plate' in increasing foreign aid in response to COVID-19. **Our analysis urges caution. The picture is as much one of 'plugging holes in the dam' of a system that donors** consistently fail to adequately resource in more normal times.

Canada's global response to COVID-19, which we estimate to be CAD\$1.5-1.6billion, has been among the **fastest and strongest**. This is the **single largest foreign aid infusion** in a fiscal cycle in Canadian history. It makes Canada one of the largest donors to date. But it is hardly surprising. According to the IMF's latest fiscal monitor Canada's total fiscal response to COVID-19 as a share of GDP was the highest among G20 advanced economies.

Leaving aside recent critiques of Canada exercising its Covax option **the mere fact that mechanisms like the Covid tools accelerator (ACT-A) and Covax were set up in record time is a significant win for multilateralism. They are especially a win for Canada** which has been a leading and foundational supporter in almost every initiative. At present Canada is the second largest contributor to ACT-A, among the top four to the vaccine pillar; and the second largest donor to the Covax AMC which procures COVID-19 vaccines for the poorest countries.

It is inescapable however that these mechanisms point to **gaps in the system**. The fact that funding to meet their resource needs required extraordinary fiscal allocation is a consequence of **imbalanced burden sharing across donors in more normal times** and persistently underfunded aid budgets.

The dilemma Canada faces is a product of two factors: **timing and messaging**. Despite having by far the highest vaccine procurement to population ratio (and an even higher ratio relative to disease burden), at present Canada's vaccination rates are among the lowest compared to peers. This, in turn, has meant that **Canada has been 'politically forced'** to exercise its self-financed Covax procurement option (SFP) which does not count as foreign aid. The timing of this in Round 1 when only a limited supply (approx. 320 million doses) is being made available and a wide range of developing countries – many of Canada's largest aid recipients – have expressed frustration

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<sup>1</sup> See full analysis: <http://cidpnsi.ca/canadas-covax-dilemma/>

with Covax (for example, the [AU, South Africa, Honduras, Serbia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Thailand](#)) is particularly unfortunate.

Canada's allocation of approximately 1.9 million doses from Round 1 amounts to 0.6% of total allocation, but a much higher share (3.6%) of allocation to SFP countries. **Lack of transparency and unclear messaging** makes matters worse. For example, [domestically Canadian officials have reported a figure of 3.2mn expected from Covax](#) by the end of June. Canada's Covax reported allocation is in line as a share of population with other SFP countries. The higher figure would bring it in line with allocations to the poorest and neediest AMC countries.

Our research finds indications of one payment (CAD\$110 million) likely having been made in late 2020 (though no hard evidence of this yet in official open data). But since Canada is contributing CA\$440 million split between both the AMC (CA\$220 million, which counts as aid), and SFP (CA\$220 million) it is **unclear what amounts towards which facility have been delivered** so far (all payments are likely to be completed by the end of the fiscal year).

Canada's messaging is confused by the fact that during the [announcement of the commitment back in fall 2020](#), officials highlighted fairness, equity, and Covax as a shining example of multilateral cooperation. And yet **downplayed or altogether neglected to mention that the facility was set up first and foremost to vaccinate essential health workers in the poorest countries and thereafter only up to approx. 20%** of the general population per country.

**Canada's (minimum) Round1 allocation is close to that of Ghana and Mozambique, and almost identical both in terms of % of allocation and population to that of Ukraine** – each, among the largest recipients of Canadian aid. Canada is not the only high-income country with low vaccination coverage to date. Yet **none of the others that have similar coverage rates and have contributed both to the AMC and SFP, and are therefore are eligible to draw from Covax, have chosen to do so** (for example, France and the Netherlands).

Beyond the solidarity rhetoric, the data imply collective action is also very cost effective. If drawn in full, **the cost of procuring vaccines for 20% of Canada's population via Covax would be (far) less than the federal government's [loan](#) to GoodLife Fitness.**

Canada's experience is a **lesson in the need for measured rhetoric and meaningful transparency.** It demonstrates why simplistic burden sharing ideas, popular in the development community, fail to work in the case of global COVID-19 response.

## 2. Avoid past mistakes and commit to sustainable increases in development spending that are maintained beyond crisis mode<sup>2</sup>

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Crises offer opportunities to align response with political incentives. While donors often increase aid spending in the short term in response to crisis, sharp short-term increases are never sustained. **We highlight three recent cases where political incentives and messaging created long term challenges** from a data integrity perspective: 9/11; the “Ebola effect”; and the refugee crisis.

COVID-19 may be worse in depth and duration than our three cases. From a donor response perspective, however, we expect it will be no different. Given the health and economic impact of the crisis on donor countries, **aid spending may be particularly vulnerable to fiscal realities coming out of the exceptional crisis period.**

Rationalizing aid increases in the middle of a crisis in the name of solidarity and equity is politically attractive from a progressive perspective. However, it can create perverse incentives and is problematic from a data integrity perspective. **Far more useful would be for donors to commit to modest increases that are sustainable beyond crisis mode.** As we demonstrate, donors should be especially careful with their rhetoric given the risk that collective action and solidarity can easily fray at the edges.

It is too early to say whether exceptional aid increases in response to COVID-19 are a sign of donors ‘stepping up to the plate’. They are **as much a sign of ‘plugging holes in the dam’ of an aid system that is inadequately resourced in more normal times.** Without appropriate caveats and a longer-term perspective, the upcoming DAC data should be viewed with caution.

How donors respond to crisis: Three recent cases

This section provides mini case studies that illustrate how short-term donor political incentives combined with the politicization of DAC data, create long-term challenges from a data integrity perspective.

### *9/11, Security, and ODA*

There has long been a [sacrosanct distinction](#) in defining what counts as “ODA”. Military aid and most peacekeeping expenses are not included. The DAC maintains a [casebook and database](#) on exclusions. **Exclusions are a key reason why major donors maintain alternative definitions to guide fiscal allocation** (in the US – ‘foreign assistance’, in Canada – ‘international assistance’). However, the proliferation of peacekeeping in the 1990s and the events of 9/11 led many members to suggest the DAC’s focus was too narrow. Some donors (Ireland and Sweden) made the case during the Gulf War that certain military expenses (medical costs) should count as ODA. After 9/11 the notion that development, conflict prevention, and peace and security were

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<sup>2</sup> See full analysis: <http://cidpnsi.ca/stepping-up-to-the-plate-or-plugging-holes-in-a-dam/>

interdependent became widely accepted. DAC [guidance was amended](#) in 2006 and 2013 to include a portion of multilateral peacekeeping within ODA. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq led to further expansion. Research since finds the correlation between [aid increases and security factors](#), while complex, strengthened around crisis events. A review of donors, Canada included, finds that since 9/11 donors [increasingly linked their aid budgets with security concerns](#). **Aid levels increased due to security factors and intervention but then fell back sharply below trend** ([Canada's aid to Afghanistan](#) is an example).

### *The "Ebola Effect"*

Prior to the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, donor ODA spending on infectious diseases was declining. A key reason for this has come to be known as the ["Ebola Effect"](#). According to the Secretary General of the OECD, "the 'Ebola effect' – or an increased funding because of the outbreak – ended abruptly in those countries affected by the epidemics in 2015. In 2018, humanitarian funding further dropped by 77%, and was not offset by development funding. **The "Ebola effect" suggests that while increased aid commitments are needed beyond the urgency of an immediate crisis, this typically does not happen.**

### *Refugee Crisis*

The refugee crisis brings concerns regarding politicization and DAC data sharply into focus. Between 2014 and 2016 ODA from donor countries [increased dramatically](#) from approximately US\$130 billion to over US\$153 billion. But **this dramatic rise in aid levels led to almost no increase in flows to developing countries. Why?** The reason is that the majority of the increase was in the form of 'in-donor refugee costs' which [quintupled](#) between 2010 and 2016, exceeding humanitarian aid for the first time. Donor political incentives and messaging aimed at domestic audiences meant that unspecific DAC guidance was applied inconsistently. **Civil society groups warned unclear rules meant donors could report increases when aid levels (excluding refugee costs) were in fact declining** (e.g. in Norway). This inconsistency allowed some donors to [achieve their commitment](#) to 0.7% ODA/GNI (UK) and others to unintentionally meet the target with a 25% increase in refugee costs counted as ODA that involved no additional outflows (Germany). Again, these bounces were short lived and the decline to trend inevitable.

**The above examples demonstrate how incentives, messaging, and politicization combine to create long-term challenges from a data integrity perspective. Similar factors are already at play during COVID-19** and are likely to affect the DAC's preliminary data on global COVID-19 response.

### *COVID-19 and preliminary DAC data: Two key reasons for caution*

The OECD-DAC's April 2021 preliminary data release is expected to provide estimates of donors' COVID-19 response based on the application of the DAC's [new approach](#). Two key issues suggest caution: methodology and timing.

## Methods are preliminary

The DAC has been iterating its approach and has compiled internal estimates based on data volunteered by donors to guide the methodology. The DAC is **using both a pilot keyword approach newly extended to COVID-19, and sector coding. A key contentious issue has been COVID-19 related research spending.** Clearly these costs are not distributed uniformly across donors. Recent guidance suggests which research costs are ODA-eligible and which are not (the latter includes the bulk of patent protected research and development into COVID-19 vaccines). However, **the [latest guidance remains preliminary](#)** and is subject to change.

Our analysis of donor spending on COVID-19 suggests there may be other issues. For example, in many cases donors have ‘pivoted’ existing projects (and funding balances) towards COVID-19 response. **How each donor has tracked and accounted for this is unclear and likely inconsistent.** Global Affairs Canada for instance has taken the approach of setting up a new element in each COVID-19 “pivot project” with a distinct amount that is specific to the purpose of responding to COVID-19. It is unclear whether others have or will take a similar or comparable approach. In cases where pivoted balances make up a significant share of a donor’s global response, inconsistency in the approach among donors can impact comparability and **create a misleading global picture.**

Furthermore, our analysis indicates there are **differences between donor announcements and data from international institutions that intermediate donor contributions.** For example, donor announcements on contributions to the main global COVID-19 response mechanisms like the Access to COVID Tools Accelerator (ACT-A) do not line up with the WHO/GAVI/Covax’s own data tables (accounting for know factors such as currency). Part of the issue is the variability in donor commitments which in some cases (for example, France’s contribution to the Covax AMC) are contingent on other criteria being met. Part of the issue may also be timing (more on this below). In general, it would not be unexpected if there are significant gaps between data on a ‘commitment’ vs. ‘disbursement’ basis, an often-overlooked distinction. In a crisis that has shown how much speed and timing matter, such **gaps would weaken the efficacy of and confidence in donor response.**

## Timing and reporting lags

While donors operate on a fiscal cycle basis, the DAC normalizes data to the calendar year. In some cases (for example, Canada) this can make a big difference in interpreting ODA data. **The most important point to note is that while the DAC may release preliminary aggregates in April, detailed disaggregated data will only become available in late 2021.** This lag, given the nature of the crisis, may render the picture presented by the aggregated data problematic to interpret and validate.

**Some of the largest ODA-eligible contributions to the global COVID-19 response have yet to take place.** For example, the Biden administration's yet to be approved and appropriated US\$1.9 trillion stimulus package contains provision for [\\$11bn in global COVID response](#). This is in addition to an emergency package approved only in December 2020 which included provision for global vaccination, disbursement of which (at last check) was yet to take effect. It is important to note there are further lags between high level appropriations, and specific investments and contributions. Some of Canada's largest contributions (for example, to WHO's ACT-A) were also only agreed in December, and much of the disbursement has yet to take place.

As it relates to timing, an additional factor is that **the crisis is not over**. While some countries are rapidly vaccinating, for others procurement has faced barriers. It is possible, if not likely, that countries that are the focus of ODA, the poorest and most vulnerable, will lag in vaccination well beyond artificial fiscal and reporting timelines. Most of the global response mechanisms are still reporting funding gaps, just to procure vaccines and respond to health sector needs, let alone to stimulate economic recovery. To date, donors have collectively and individually provided little indication of how they will rectify the diversion of resources away from other sectors to health.

The impact of COVID -19 on the aid system and ODA data will take place further down the road. **Early estimates of donor response should be treated with a great deal of caution.**

### 3. Review Canada's engagement with the multilateral development system

Despite dedicated divisions at both Global Affairs (GAC) and the Department of Finance, Canada does not appear to have a discernable multilateral strategy. The Department of Finance conducts proforma annual consultations inviting comments on payments to multilaterals and GAC routinely participates in donor reviews.<sup>3</sup> However, these fail to get at the two most basic and fundamentally important questions:

- Does multilateral engagement represent the best means of achieving Canada's development objectives, i.e., **does it deliver the expected impact?**
- Is Canada's multilateral engagement **right sized, i.e., balanced** in terms of the various modalities and options available, commensurate with resources and capacity, and consistent with strategic objectives and priorities?

**COVID19 reinforces the need for a multilateral review.** A global pandemic represents the perfect collective action use-case and raison d'être for multilaterals. However, it has also **highlighted weaknesses inherent in the system.** Most of Canada's contribution to global COVID19 response

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<sup>3</sup> Dept of Finance consultations are narrowly concerned with consistency of multilateral payments with legislation, chiefly the ODA accountability act. An example of donor review is the Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN).



will be intermediated via multilaterals.<sup>4</sup> Drawing lessons from this experience of the largest one-time infusion of ODA ever undertaken by Canada will be vitally important.

### **The Surprisingly Strong Case for Multilaterals in Development**

In a world of significant bilateral aid programs and fast-growing private sector linkages, why should multilaterals exist? While it may seem philosophical, this is a highly practical question that speaks directly to incentives and alignment.<sup>5</sup> **Donors, whether thoughtfully or otherwise, under external and self-imposed constraints (limited budget and imperfect information), essentially make a zero-sum allocation decision** when they choose to route ODA via multilaterals vs. other channels such as civil society or directly via partner country governments and institutions. Beyond the generalities of collective action, historically, the most important argument in favor of multilaterals in the intermediation of ODA boils down to depoliticization and inclusion of all beneficiary countries.

As pointed out by Rodrik (1995) and others, so long as multilaterals retain some degree of autonomy from their shareholder governments, this endows them with an advantage in the exercise of necessary conditionality. This rationale explains the genesis and early years of the multilateral development system. But not its more recent evolution and surprisingly strengthened rationale.

**Over a nearly four-decade period till about the late 1990s, donors channeled aid through 7 to 10 official multilateral agencies.** Since this point, in part due to the success of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in refocusing and energizing the aid sector, the proliferation of multilaterals in development has expanded considerably. **Today donor countries channel aid via nearly 45 official multilateral agencies.** The main factor that underpins this growth is technical specialization in the provision of global public goods. Key examples include the health sector where verticals like the Global Fund and GAVI now make up the largest shares of most donor health budgets; and climate change where the likes of the Green Climate Fund and Global Green Growth Initiative which emerged more recently are playing a similar role.

And yet the strengthened case for multilaterals in development is somewhat surprising for two reasons. **First because of the lack of empirical support.** The literature (in this case a review of 45 studies that empirically test the association between types of aid flows, bilateral vs. multilateral, and a range of development outcomes) finds no consistent evidence that either bilateral or multilateral aid is more effective than the other.<sup>6</sup> Second, ironically, this **proliferation of**

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<sup>4</sup> Chiefly via the new ACT Accelerator, the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness (CEPI), and the COVAX AMC.

<sup>5</sup> It was raised in a seminal empirical analysis by Dani Rodrik back in 1995, "Why is there multilateral lending?" [https://www.nber.org/system/files/working\\_papers/w5160/w5160.pdf](https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w5160/w5160.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> Simply put other factors are more important. See: Biscaye P. et al. (2017). "Relative Effectiveness of Bilateral and Multilateral Aid on Development Outcomes", in *Review of Development Economics* 21(4). Online: <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/rode.12303>

**multilaterals has occurred at a time when several donor budgets (especially mid-sized) have declined both in real dollar terms and as a proportion to national income (ODA/GNI).**

Faced with increasing demands from a proliferation of multilaterals, one response has been the **increasing use of ‘multi-bi’ channels or ‘bilateralization’**, (also referred to as ‘instrumentalization’) of the multilateral development system. This trend, aimed more as a signaling device to domestic donor audiences than pursuit of development outcomes, has come at a considerable cost to performance, credibility, and increased administrative burden.<sup>7</sup> In other words, donors have ironically simultaneously, increased support to and demands of the system rendering it progressively less effective.

Far from questioning the importance of multilaterals in ODA, these factors suggest the timing of a review especially from the perspective of a mid-sized (and highly multilateral-biased) donor like Canada may be particularly opportune.

### **Canada and the Multilateral Development System**

Canada is a major contributor to the multilateral development system. However, as a mid-sized donor Canada also derives significant benefits from the systems in terms of international visibility, the ability to ‘punch above its weight’ and have a ‘seat at the big table’. As elaborated below, Canada’s engagement and presence across development multilaterals has in some cases become very imbalanced. Given the current size of the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), limited staff capacity, and a non-existent multilateral strategy, Canada risks spreading itself thin across multilateral fora.<sup>8</sup>

Canada increasingly channels ‘earmarked’ bilateral spending via multilaterals. In this regard it is a very direct and significant contributor to the above mentioned ‘bilateralization’ problem. In fact, it can be argued Canada is a relative multilateral ‘free rider’. In 2018, Canada’s share of core contributions to the multilateral development system stood at approx. 3.5%, while its share of the additional earmarked aid channeled via multilaterals stood at approx. 6.5%.<sup>9</sup> In other words Canada is an even bigger user of the system than contributor to the system.

These trends are clearer at the sector level. Overall, about 60% of GAC’s programming is channeled via multilaterals, **triple the amount channeled via Canadian civil society or 15 times the level channeled directly to developing country governments and institutions.** In certain sectors, where collective action and coordination are at a premium, such as health and humanitarian response, this share is even higher and defensibly so. In other areas the imbalance is too lopsided to make sense. This is arguably the case with Canada’s climate finance, almost all

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<sup>7</sup> See: Gulrajani, N. (2016). “Bilateral vs. Multilateral Aid Channels: Strategic Choices for Donors”, ODI. Online: <https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/10393.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> A good example of this ‘thinning’ in action is the decision to join the AIIB.

<sup>9</sup> These issues have been articulated directly to both GAC and Finance Canada. See: <http://cidpnsi.ca/submission-to-department-of-finance-consultation-on-official-development-assistance-2020/>

of which (90% in 2017) is channeled via Canadian branded trust funds at a handful of multilaterals.<sup>10</sup>

**What explains Canada’s approach?** For a mid-sized donor, this approach offers four particularly important advantages: risk mitigation, leverage, scale, and bureaucratic expediency. Aid delivery and development are high risk endeavors. Canada is a highly risk averse donor engaged in a high-risk business, with high degree of performance pressure from all sides (internal, external, taxpayers, partners). Multilaterals are considered GAC’s lowest risk partners and easiest to program funding to. Therefore, it is obvious to see the attractiveness of this approach from a bureaucratic expediency perspective.

However, this approach overlooks **key issues that receive little to no strategic attention**:

- **Overall systemic effectiveness and impact:** does Canada’s engagement contribute to or detract from the effectiveness of the system, and what should our expectations be in terms of impacts and outcomes, given the type and scale of our inputs?
- **Competitive dynamics and ratcheting effects:** not all multilaterals are alike in terms of quality and effectiveness. Yet once created, each has an incremental ratcheting effect on donor budgets. Multilaterals compete with one another for shareholder attention and funding. These dynamics are not adequately analyzed or appreciated at a strategic level.
- **Gaps and inevitable losses in transparency, accountability, reportability, and attribution:** for the wide advantages offered, use of multilaterals as a channel also entails trade offs by way of limited direct attribution of impacts to individual donor investment.
- **Cost and value proposition:** the literature is clear, using whatever parameter (from share of overheads, to ratio of salaries to programming) multilateral ODA is consistently the most expensive to deliver compared to other options.<sup>11</sup>

A review that looks at Canada’s engagement with the multilateral development system focusing on the two questions posed at the outset – whether Canada’s multilateral engagement represents the best possible way of pursuing its development objectives, and if it is right sized and balanced – would do well to keep the above overlooked areas equally in focus.

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<sup>10</sup> Specifically, Asian and Inter-American Development Bank, International Finance Corp., and GCF. See: <https://cidpnsi.ca/reset-canadas-approach-to-international-climate-finance/>

<sup>11</sup> See: Gulrajani, N. (2016) *ibid*.


## Data Annex

### Fiscal Response to COVID19

(Above the line measures not counting liquidity support; as of Oct 2020; % of GDP)

Source: IMF Oct 2020 Fiscal Monitor


<https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/FM/Issues/2020/09/30/october-2020-fiscal-monitor>



### Estimated Total Global COVID19 Response (select donors)

Note: Total donor response not limited to 'ODA'. Various sources, see detailed method; includes new Covid specific and 'pivot' investments based on donor public reporting; normalized to USD\$, to the extent possible covering all figs announced since the start of the pandemic


Note: the US is excluded from the graph, but, inclusive of the \$1.9trillion Biden stimulus of which \$11bn is allocated to global response, the US figure alone is estimated at \$26bn



## Top Donors to Covax AMC (as of Dec 18,2020)

Major donors to the Covax AMC aimed at procuring COVID19 vaccines for low/low middle income countries


Source: <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax>



## Top 10 Donors to ACT-A (as of Jan 15,2021)

Top 10 donors account for 97% of all public funding mobilized by ACT-A as on date. Both total and donor contributions to the vaccine pillar are provided. (Note: data does not correspond with national sources in all cases).


Source: <https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/covax>



## Doses Procured to Population and Burden (as of Feb 1, 2021)


Ratio calculated based on reported procurement contract volumes and latest (2020) population data.

Source: <https://launchandscalefaster.org/COVID-19>




## Round1 Covax Allocation (as of Feb 3,2021) - Top 20 Self Financing Participants

Source: <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-Interim-Distribution-Forecast.pdf>



## Round1 Covax Allocation (as of Feb 3,2021) - Top 20 AMC Participants

Source: <https://www.gavi.org/sites/default/files/covid/covax/COVAX-Interim-Distribution-Forecast.pdf>






## Projections on Canada’s international development spending trend out to 2030

### Scenario Comparison Summary<sup>12</sup>

	Scenario A: Doubling IAE in 5 years	Scenario B: Doubling IAE in 10 years	Scenario C: COVID bump, then no substantial increases to IAE
Year IAE doubles	2025-26	2030-31	–
Average Annual Dollar Growth in IAE (mn) (baseline = 2019-2020)	\$953	\$521	\$100
IAE in 2025-26	\$11,378	\$8,796	\$6,256
ODA/GNI Ratio in 2025-26	0.43%	0.34%	0.25%
IAE in 2030-31	\$11,878	\$11,387	\$6,756
ODA/GNI Ratio in 2030-31	0.37%	0.36%	0.22%

Source: CIDP analysis

### Projected paths for Canada’s IAE in three scenarios<sup>13</sup>



Source: CIDP analysis

<sup>12</sup> 2020 Fall Economic Statement and IAE Scenarios for Canada <http://cidpsi.ca/2020-fall-economic-statement-and-iae-scenarios-for-canada/>

<sup>13</sup> 2020 Fall Economic Statement and IAE Scenarios for Canada <http://cidpsi.ca/2020-fall-economic-statement-and-iae-scenarios-for-canada/>